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Abstract—Most existing solutions for protecting VMs assume
known attack patterns or signatures and focus on detecting
malicious manipulations of system files and kernel level memory
structures. In this research we develop a system called ferify,
which leverages VM introspection (VMI) to protect user files
hosted on a VM against unauthorized access even after an
attacker has managed to obtain root privileges on the VM.
ferify maintains in the hypervisor domain a shadow file access
control list (SACL) that is totally transparent to the VM. It uses
the SACL to perform independent access control on all system
calls that may operate on the target files. Further, ferify
prevents kernel modification, ensures the integrity of process
ownership, and supports hypervisor based user authentication.
We have developed a ferify prototype for Linux and through
a set of controlled experiments we show that the system is able
to mitigate a range of zero-day attacks that otherwise may evade
signature-based solutions. In addition, we analyze the root cause
of the observed high processing overhead from trapping of system
calls, and propose a general solution that can potentially cut that
overhead by half.
I. INTRODUCTION
A successful attack on a computer system typically results
in the attacker obtaining the root privilege for the system. If
the computer system is a virtual machine (VM), this means
that the attacker has total access to all files hosted on the VM.
How to detect and contain this type of root-kit attacks remains
an important security problem.
While virtualization brings about new security challenges
specific to VM operation, it also offers new solution ap-
proaches. The research community has long recognized the
unique vantage point provided by the hypervisor for VM
monitoring and malware detection. In particular, the VM
introspection (VMI) capabilities [11], [16] have shown great
promise. We observe two main advantages by deploying
security solutions on the hypervisor. First, the code base is
relatively small due to its narrow focus and thus, is relatively
easy to catch software bugs or presence of malware. Second,
being part of the critical path for accessing physical resources,
the hypervisor is able to exert independent and process/thread
level control over program executions on a guest VM. And this
control can be dynamic, e.g., revoking a user’s permission to
access certain resources without rebooting the VM.
Paladin [1] is among the first systems that leverage VMI to
detect malicious manipulations of system files and/or run-time
data structures and contain such attacks by aborting the offend-
ing processes and rolling back suspicious data modifications.
However, this system requires a trusted software helper module
running in the guest VM [1]. More importantly, Paladin as well
as most other existing solutions for protecting VMs focus on
protecting systems files and other data against known attack
signatures. Thus, these solutions may have limited power
against zero-day attacks.
In this paper, we present the design and evaluation of a user
centric VM file protection system which we call ferify. As
an overarching goal, we seek to protect selected user files
hosted on a VM against unauthorized access in spite of a
successful attack on the VM. ferify is implemented as a
DRAKVUF [11] plugin that is completely independent from
the guest VM. It maintains a separate file access control list
(ACL) in the hypervisor and performs access control on all
system calls that may operate on the target files. Additionally,
we constrain kernel modifications and ensure the integrity of
process ownership and other critical data in order to mitigate
a range of zero-day attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review re-
lated work and provide background information in Section II.
We present the design and implementation details of ferify
in Sections III and IV, respectively. A detailed evaluation
of the system’s file protection capabilities and its processing
overhead is provided in Section V, followed by a detailed
analysis of the overhead along with a solution for reducing
it in Section VI. Finally, we discuss possible extensions and
its current limitations in Section VII and then offer some
concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first review existing security solutions
that are most related to this work and then provide a short
description of the DRAKVUF and LibVMI software, upon
which ferify has been built.
VM monitoring and protection: Table I presents a sum-
mary of seventeen relevant solutions found in the literature.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
08
99
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 A
pr
 20
20
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS.
Kernel Protection File Protection
Solution In-VM Out-VM Detection Prevention Detection Prevention
Virtuoso [6], SIM [21] X - X - - -
Haven [2], Overshadow [4],
InkTag [9], Lares [16], SHype [19] X - - X - -
Crawford and Peterson [5], ReVirt [7],
VMI [8], VMWatcher [10], - X X - - -
Macko et al. [12], PoKeR [18],
Strider, Ghostbuster [25]
SecVisor [20], Srinivasan et al. [22] - X - X - -
Sentry [23], HUKO [27]
Nasab [13] - X - X X -
Paladin [1] X - - X X X
Some are integrated into the VM (i.e., “in-VM”) while others
leverage the hypervisor (i.e.,“Out-VM”). Most focus on ensur-
ing kernel integrity and protecting kernel level data structures
such as the process control block. Only two solutions [1], [13]
provide some level of file protection; however, they require
known attack signatures.
DRAKVUF / LibVMI: LibVMI [15] is a C library
developed by the Sandia Labs to simplify the develop-
ment of VM introspection solutions for the Xen hypervi-
sor. DRAKVUF [11] is a malware analysis tool built upon
LibVMI. It supports in-depth execution tracing of arbitrary
binaries (including kernel processes) that is totally transparent
to the VM being monitored. Furthermore, it is designed to be
extensible by supporting plugins.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we first describe the threat model and
high level requirements and then present the details of how
ferify traps system calls and is able to continue file access
control even after the root account of the target VM has been
compromised.
A. Threat Model and Requirements
We have designed ferify by assuming this threat model:
• The hypervisor is considered secure; how to protect the
hypervisor is outside the scope of this research.
• The protected files are only remotely accessible and pro-
tected by a public-key authentication and encryption scheme
(i.e., SSH).
• The private keys of authorized users are secure, while the
attacker may have obtained root privileges on the VM
through a successful attack.
Additionally, we have set these high level design objectives:
• The solution must be completely out-VM to avoid subver-
sion from the VM side.
• The protected VM must remain usable by authorized users.
In particular, the extra processing overhead incurred by the
solution must be bounded to a tolerable range.
B. Basic Functionality
The high level design of ferify for Linux and Xen
is illustrated in Fig. 1. In a nutshell, the system traps all
relevant system calls and uses a shadow access control (SACL)
maintained inside the hypervisor to perform file access control.
ferify identifies authorized user accounts by their uid and
gid in the SACL; therefore, it includes additional security
measures to ensure the integrity of (i) user and group iden-
tification, (ii) process ownership, and (iii) the kernel, as well
as two further extensions to enhance security, which will be
presented in the succeeding sub-section C.
Vulnerable VM
Protection Zone
DRAKVUF /
LibVMI ferify plugin
Attacker
File or kernel operation
Authorized user
Trapped
sys-calls
NoSTOP
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HDD
Other
files
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files
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Fig. 1. Design overview
Trapping of System Calls: We use DRAKVUF [11] to trap
a specific set of system calls that are relevant to file operations
and kernel access, as listed in Table II. A trap in our case is
a software breakpoint (opcode 0xCC or the so-called INT 3
instruction for an Intel x86 CPU) injected at the beginning
of all trapped system calls. The behavior can be compared to
that of a debugger. LibVMI allows for the assignment of a
callback function that gets executed when a trap gets caught.
ferify provides a callback function that checks the validity
of each trapped system call.
TABLE II
TRAPPED SYSTEM CALLS
open() openat()
name to handle at()* open by handle at()*
rename() renameat()
renameat2() unlink()
unlinkat() truncate()
link() linkat()
symlink() symlinkat()
execve() execveat()
exit() exit group()
init module()* finit module()*
kexec load()*
Specifically, the callback function retrieves the arguments
of the system call from the CPU registers according to the
64-bit Linux system call convention and then performs all the
necessary checks against the SACL. The format of the SACL
is shown in Fig. 2. The “Permission” field is set following the
Linux three-octet file permission convention (u|g|o), referring
to the permission for the user owning the file, users of the same
group, and all other users, respectively. The three bits of each
octet represent the read, write, and execute permission flag,
respectively. Therefore, for the example in Fig. 2, 644 means
that the owner of the file can read and write to the file while all
other users including those of the same group have only read
access. 400 means that the owner of the file can read the file,
while no other users have access to the file. The “User” and
“Group” fields provide the uid and gid of the file owner,
respectively, with a special value of 0 referring to the root
user or the root user group. Finally, if the file in question does
not have an entry in the SACL, ferify deems it noncritical
and the check successful.
Full path file or directory name Permission User Group
/home/user/Documents/critical.txt 644 1000 1000
/home/user/Desktop/read-only.pdf 400 1000 1000
/etc/shadow 220 0 0
Fig. 2. Example SACL entries.
The system call is allowed to proceed only if it passes the
SACL check. When the decision is to deny the system call,
ferify replaces the pointer that holds the file-name with a
NULL pointer; doing so allows the system call to proceed but
eventually fail when it tries to de-reference a NULL pointer.
We have successfully trapped and processed all system calls
listed in Table II, albeit we currently simply deny those system
calls marked with an asterisk due to time constraints for
carrying out the implementation.
User & Group Integrity: ferify prohibits switch-
ing of user accounts through the su command, by deny-
ing all users including the root the write permission to the
/etc/pam.d/su file. Similarly, it enforces no write to
password files /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow by adding
deny entries in the SACL. This may raise usability challenges
for authorized users. However, we envision that the VM will be
periodically taken offline for maintenance and in these offline
periods, these account restrictions can be lifted.
Process Ownership Integrity: For each running user
process, ferify keeps track of the uid and gid of its
creator. This tracking allows for monitoring of malicious
attempts to change this ownership information. Specifically,
ferify traps the ret from fork kernel symbol and
store in the hypervisor a hashtable of the owner information
for all legitimate processes created by authorized users. (It also
traps clone() to monitor all new processes.) This hashtable
is then used to determine if a trapped system call is indeed
made by an authorized user1 before the SACL check.
Kernel Integrity: By default, a (malicious) root user can
modify kernel structure data and load new kernel modules.
To mitigate this attack vector, ferify traps and blocks the
init mod() and finit mod() system calls. It also
write-protects /etc/modules, and possibly additional files
and folders depending on the Linux distribution, to prevent
the loading of new kernel modules during boot time. Doing
so clearly imposes some usability issues. As discussed earlier,
we envision to perform the legitimate kernel modifications in
specific maintenance periods when the VM is taken offline
and after properly authenticating and checking of the integrity
of the new kernel modules.
To protect against malicious kernel swapping, ferify
blocks the system call kexec load(), which loads a
new kernel for later execution. This introduces a usability
limitation, by not allowing automatic kernel updates, some of
which are necessary to fix kernel bugs. Since this operation can
be performed in a more controlled environment (i.e., during
offline periods) at the administrator’s discretion, we expect this
to be a reasonable limitation.
C. Two Extensions
To further enhance security, we extend ferify in two
aspects.
2-Step Authentication: We have integrated into ferify a
two-step authentication mechanism leveraging the hypervisor
as a user authenticating agent. The authentication is based on a
pre-configured shared secret between each authorized user and
the hypervisor, and performed as part of the callback function
for the open() system call. Specifically, when this option
is turned on for an authorized user, even after the user has
successfully logged into the VM, ferify still considers the
user “unauthenticated” until he/she passes a second form of
authentication as follows. The user must prove that he/she pos-
sesses the shared secret by presenting a challenge response pair
of strings to ferify, the latter of which is the SHA512 hash
of the former concatenated with the shared secret, through an
open() system call. For example, the user may trigger this
authentication through the touch command and encode the
challenge response strings in the file-name argument along
with an artificial path-name to avoid collision with a real file.
1If there is a legitimate change in the ownership of a process (through
sudo) we update the stored information. This update is important in order
to retain system usability.
After ferify verifies that the challenge response strings
are valid, it changes the user’s status to “authenticated” for a
predetermined time-frame, during which the user’s file access
permission will be according to the SACL; otherwise, the user
remains in the “unauthenticated” status and will not be granted
access to any file specified in the SACL.
Program Execution White-Listing: We have added an
option to the callback functions of the execve() and
execve at() system calls for ferify to deny, instead
of permit by default, execution of a file that is not listed in
the SACL. In other words, when this option is turned on,
a file can be executed only if it has a permit entry in the
SACL. Effectively, this option makes the SACL a white-list
for program execution. Again, there is a trade-off of usability
with this option, but we believe this option is useful for certain
deployment scenarios.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have created a prototype implementation of ferify for
Linux, as a plugin for the v0.5-655884f version of DRAKVUF,
which is bundled with the 0.12 release of LibVMI and the
4.8.1 version of Xen. The implementation consists of about
2,400 lines of C code2. The SACL is implemented as a
hashtable to bound the search processing overhead. To assist
testing with different SACL sizes, we have also created a script
that retrieves information for all files currently residing in a
given VM and creates an artificial full SACL with a “permit”
entry for each of the files.
We have chosen a computer with an Intel i7-6700 CPU
as the test platform, given that DRAKVUF [11] is designed
to take advantage of hardware virtualization extensions found
in Intel CPUs. The computer is equipped with 8 GB of
RAM. It runs the Ubuntu 16.04 64-bit version of Linux, more
specifically, the 4.10.0-30-generic kernel, as the host operating
system (OS) for Dom0. The guest VM also runs Ubuntu 16.04
64-bit, but with the 4.8.0-54-generic kernel.
V. EVALUATION
Our evaluation of ferify consists of two parts. First, we
validate its ability to protect files against unauthorized access,
particularly its potential to mitigate zero-day attacks. Second,
as ferify needs to trap more than a dozen system calls, we
quantify expected performance degradation upon authorized
users due to the extra processing overhead it introduces.
A. Validation of File Protection
Ideally, we can enumerate the exact range of attacks that
ferify is able to mitigate and perform experiments to
confirm the effectiveness. However, given the unpredictable
nature of zero-day attacks, and the amount of effort required
to hypothesize and enact the likely large number of attacks
to ensure coverage, we take an alternative, more practical,
approach, whereby we show the main design features as pre-
sented in Section III achieve their objectives. More specifically,
2We will make all source code publicly available once the double blind
requirement for this paper is lifted.
we consider two types of access to protected files hosted on
the guest VM: one by an authorized user and the other by an
attacker, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In line with our threat model,
we assume that (i) the authorized user’s private key is secure
and (ii) the attacker has gained root privileges on the guest
VM through a compromise originating from a different user
ID than the legitimate user.
To validate ferify’s basic functionality, we performed
specific file operations to emulate the actions of the attacker.
We try these operations with different permissions defined in
the SACL each time, to verify that the permissions we set
are actually enforced. The SACL we used contains all files of
the VM system.3 The results of the tests show that we can
successfully deny unauthorized access to protected files, even
if the OS of the VM would allow it given that the attacker has
gained root privileges.
User & Group Integrity: As our tests reveal, we can
limit access to files on a per user basis. This constraint
applies equally to all users, including the root user. Fig. 3
shows the SACL implementation for the /etc/shadow and
/etc/pam.d/su files, and Fig. 4 shows the result of the
root user trying to change another user’s password, after the
/etc/shadow file has been write protected in the SACL.
Full Path File Name Permissions User Group
/etc/shadow 400 0 0
/etc/pam.d/su 000 0 0
Fig. 3. SACL entries preventing root user from overwriting two system files.
root@HVM-domU:#˜ passwd alice
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: Authentication token manipulation error
passwd: password unchanged
root@HVM-domU:#˜
Fig. 4. Confirmation of denial of password change from root account.
In addition, we validated that ferify is able to prevent
escalation of user’s privilege to root through the sudo com-
mand, as illustrated by Fig. 5. For brevity we omit the actual
SACL entries for implementing this policy.
user@HVM-domU:$˜ sudo ls
sudo: unable to open /etc/sudoers: Bad address
sudo: no valid sudoers sources found, quitting
sudo: unable to initialize policy plugin
user@HVM-domU:$˜
Fig. 5. Confirmation of failure of sudo.
From these experimental results, we extrapolate that
ferify can enforce some files to be immutable, by removing
the write permissions from all users, including the root.4
Additionally, by removing only the read permissions on system
3The VM was a fresh installation of Linux with only a few essential
packages added, such as gcc, rekall, and openssh-server. The SACL for this
setup contained more than 400,000 entries.
4Paladin [1] can also achieve this effect.
log files, we allow for normal logging operation, but an
attacker cannot read the log-file and select which entries to
delete, to hide any malicious activity, making the “hiding of
tracks” harder for the attacker.
Process Ownership Integrity: From the literature, to
the best of our knowledge, the only effective way to alter
a process’s ownership information appears to be through a
kernel module. This is because that information is stored
in the task struct data structure, which is part of the
kernel memory space. To directly access and manipulate kernel
memory variables the attacker must be able to run code as
part of the kernel, i.e., using a kernel module. Therefore, the
validation results for the Kernel Integrity part (which we will
present next) also applies to this functionality.
Kernel Integrity: Since the kernel protection mechanism
consists simply of denying addition of kernel module when the
VM is online, the validation was relatively straightforward.
Fig. 6 shows the test result of trying to load a new kernel
module.
root@HVM-domU:#˜ insmod my module.ko
insmod: ERROR: could not insert module
my module.ko: Bad file descriptor
root@HVM-domU:#˜
Fig. 6. Confirmation of denying addition of new kernel module.
2-step Authentication: In this test, we turned on the option
for the authorized user. Therefore, the user was considered
“unauthenticated” even after it had passed the user authentica-
tion by the VM and started an ssh session. Therefore as Fig. 7
shows, the user couldn’t access test1.txt even though the
SACL contained a permit entry for the user regarding this
particular file.
user@HVM-domU:#˜ echo hi > test1.txt
-bash: echo write error: Bad file descriptor
root@HVM-domU:#˜
Fig. 7. Confirmation of failed file creation before second authentication.
At the next step, as Fig. 8 shows, we ran the touch
command to perform the second authentication by providing
a valid pair of challenge response strings based on a shared
secret pre-configured in ferify. It should be noted that even
though the authentication was successful, an error message
was outputted because of the artificial file name string.
user@HVM-domU:#˜ touch /tokens/1110d209df92a6f603f89
d18e2b79dda732fe88c2fcf2347024d1b4244e1d0013723107b
419e6fe7d6d0dd80b4a45d06d02271473dce873477528a67f4b
b2312267
touch: cannot touch ’/tokens/1110d209df92a6f603f89d
18e2b79dda732fe88c2fcf2347024d1b4244e1d0013723107b4
19e6fe7d6d0dd80b4a45d06d02271473dce873477528a67f4bb
2312267’: No such file or directory
root@HVM-domU:#˜
Fig. 8. Illustration of second authentication using touch.
After the successful 2-step authentication, as Fig. 9 shows,
the user was able to create test1.txt as expected.
user@HVM-domU:#˜ echo hi > test1.txt
root@HVM-domU:#˜
Fig. 9. Confirmation of file creation after successful 2-step authentication.
Program White-Listing: We turned on this option. We
created a test program that simply prints out the string:
“Can run this program.” We added a permit entry for this
program in the SACL. We ran the program and then ran an
exact copy of it, newfile, which was not added to the SACL.
As Fig. 10 shows, the first execution was successful because
test was in the white-list but the second execution failed
because newfile was not white-listed.
user@HVM-domU:#˜ ./test
Can run this program.
user@HVM-domU:#˜ cp test newfile
user@HVM-domU:#˜ ./newfile
-bash: ./newfile: Bad address
user@HVM-domU:#˜
Fig. 10. Confirmation of program white-listing.
B. Quantification of Processing Overhead
To quantify the processing overhead incurred by ferify
upon an authorized user, we have selected three of the most
occurring system calls it traps – namely, open() (for read
& write), rename() (for moving files), and unlink() (for
deleting files) – and benchmarked their performance in each
of these three scenarios:
S1 ferify is not deployed, i.e., no system call is actually
trapped.
S2 ferify is deployed, but with an empty SACL; in this
case, there is no need to search the SACL for a specific
file.
S3 ferify is deployed with a full SACL, i.e., with an entry
for each file in the VM. The SACL contains more than
200,000 entries.
In addition, we examine whether it is possible to increase the
performance of ferify by adjusting its scheduling priority.
We consider three cases: (i) no adjustment; (ii) the processing
priority of ferify is maximized using the nice command;
and (iii) both the processing and I/O priorities are maximized
using the nice and ionice commands, respectively.
The bench-marking of each system call is repeated 20 times
for each scenario and scheduling priority combination. Their
average processing times (in ms) are reported in Table III.
First, we observe that ferify’s overall processing over-
head per system call is in the millisecond range, which is
usable for most applications, while the overhead is significant
as the processing times jumped by more than one order of
magnitude with ferify’s deployment. Second, somewhat
surprisingly, we observe that adjusting scheduling priorities
had little effect on the processing times. Lastly and im-
portantly, we see that there is little change of performance
from an empty to full SACL, which indicates that the SACL
look-up and permission checking actions incurred a very
small portion of the overall overhead. In other words, the
time spent by other actions, mainly performed by the core
DRAKVUF/LibVMI code for trapping the system calls, might
dominate the ferify processing overhead.
TABLE III
ferify PROCESSING OVERHEAD MEASUREMENTS
Ratio of increase
Without ferify With ferify With ferify
System call Avg time (msec) empty SACL full SACL
No scheduler priority set
open() 0.273 5.167 6.385
rename() 0.119 9.891 15.326
unlink() 0.110 11.461 14.732
With best nice value
open() 0.273 6.623 6.389
rename() 0.119 12.686 14.928
unlink() 0.110 14.643 14.426
With best nice and ionice values
open() 0.273 6.461 7.713
rename() 0.119 13.000 18.238
unlink() 0.110 14.926 17.384
To further explore this hypothesis, we have conducted
additional experiments with ferify deployed using default
scheduling priorities, while varying the SACL size four times,
to 100, 1000, 10000, and 100000 entries, respectively. The
results are plotted in Fig. 11. We observe that the overall
processing times for each of the three systems call did not
change much as the SACL size increases. This is not surprising
given that the SACL has been implemented as a hashtable and
confirms that SACL processing incurs a very small portion of
the overall overhead.
Fig. 11. Little changes in ave. system call processing times for 4 SACL sizes.
VI. UNDERSTANDING OVERHEAD OF VM INTROSPECTION
DRAKVUF and LibVMI software hides almost all the
system call trapping details from a plugin. To explain why
ferify introduces significant processing overhead as pre-
sented in Table III, we have to dig deep into the DRAKVUF
and LibVMI source code. After a careful analysis, we discover
that the primary contributor to the processing overhead are the
multiple CPU context-switches between the hypervisor and the
guest VM. The details of our analysis are presented in this
section.
A. The Tale of Four Context-Switches
DRAKVUF traps a system call in the same way as a
debugger like gdb does. Specifically, DRAKVUF replaces
the instruction stored in the memory location indicated, with
the software breakpoint signal (i.e., opcode 0xCC). Therefore,
when the instruction pointer (I.P.) of the VM reaches the
trapped address, the CPU will raise a software interrupt. This
event, by the way in which Xen handles such interrupts, causes
a context switch from the VM to the hypervisor. This context
switch is commonly called “VM-exit” in the Xen literature.
Right after this context switch, Xen’s master interrupt
handler checks for a registered process in Dom0 to handle the
interrupt. If no such process exists the hypervisor propagates
the interrupt to the VM, to be handled by the guest OS.
Therefore when ferify is running and registered for the
interrupt, the master handler will select it to respond to the
interrupt.
As soon as ferify completes its checking of file access
permissions and clears the relevant register(s) when the de-
cision is to deny the access, DRAKVUF must, again like
a debugger, replace the breakpoint signal with the original
instruction to allow the system call to proceed. Furthermore,
DRAKVUF must also inject the breakpoint signal back after
execution of only one instruction in order to reset the trap and
not miss any future instance of the system call. Currently, there
is only one known way to meet the stringent timing require-
ment for resetting the trap; that is, to put the original process
in the single-step execution mode. DRAKVUF accomplishes
this by setting a CPU register (flag), just as a debugger would
do, before resuming the trapped process. Note that another
context switch happens as a result, commonly called “VM-
entry”. Then, after execution of the first instruction, the CPU
will raise an exception due to the single-stepping mode. This
will be caught by the hypervisor and its interrupt handler,
causing a second VM-exit, as illustrated in the figure below.
At this point DRAKVUF knows that one instruction has been
executed and it is safe to re-inject the breakpoint. After doing
so, it clears the CPU flag for single-stepping and returns the
trapped process to the normal execution mode, which causes
a second VM-entry.
It is well known that a context switch (VM-exit or VM-
entry) incurs a significant amount of overhead due to the need
for saving the complete state of the VM or hypervisor into
memory prior to performing the switch. Requiring four context
switches for trapping one system call, the current DRAKVUF
and LibVMI implementation is unsurprisingly the primary
source of ferify processing overhead. More importantly,
this overhead is a more general problem, impacting all systems
that use DRAKVUF and LibVMI to trap processes running on
guest VMs. Therefore, we have investigated ways to reduce
the number of context switches for trapping system calls in a
System Call Code Block Event
0x...: I1 I2 .. The first instruction of
system call (I1) is replaced
by software breakpoint.
This needs to happen
to trap the system call
0xCC
0x...: CC I2 .. System call is just invoked.
A hypervisor-VM context
switch occurs due to software
interrupt.
VM-exit #1
I.P
0x...: I1 I2 .. The breakpoint is replaced
by the original instruction
in order to resume VM
execution after
single-step is enabled.
VM-entry #1
I.P
0x...: I1 I2 .. The execution of
I1 causes a new trap
due to single-step mode.
VM-exit #2
I.P
0x...: CC I2 .. The first instruction is
replaced by interrupt
and single-step is disabled
before resuming VM.
VM-entry #2
I.P
Fig. 12. Illustration of context-switch events for trapping a system call
VM, leading to one possible solution, which we will present
in the next section.
B. A Proposal for Reducing VMI Overhead
The question of how to minimize context switches between
a guest VM and the hypervisor in order to improve system
performance has been studied in other settings [24], [26]. In
this section, we propose a solution that can cut the number of
context switches from four to two for a hypervisor based VM
introspection (VMI) system such as ferify to trap a system
call from a VM.
Specifically, we observe that the second pair of VM-exit
and VM-entry context switches, as illustrated in Fig. 12, is
necessary only because the first instruction of the system
call code needs be replaced by the software interrupt signal
immediately after each execution in order to not miss any
future invocation of the system call. In other words, the
current DRAKVUF/LibVMI implementation requires the first
instruction to toggle between two opcodes with a timing
requirement that can only be met by putting the calling process
into the single step mode. However, if the first instruction of
the system call were the “do nothing” (NOP) (i.e., opcode
0x90 for an Intel x86 CPU), DRAKVUF would be able to
replace it with the software interrupt signal permanently to trap
the system call over and over again, with only two context
switches at each time. To avoid an infinite loop, the I.P. of
the VM’s CPU will be incremented to point to the next valid
instruction.
Therefore, we propose to prepend the code of each trapped
system call with the NOP instruction, resulting in one pair of
context switches for each trapping, as illustrated in Fig. 13.
There are several ways of accomplishing the prepending. One
may revise the source code for the object code of the system
calls. For a relatively less intrusive approach, we suggest to
add such an option to C compilers.
System Call Code Block Event
0x...: 90 I1 .. 1st instruction of system
call (i.e., NOP) is replaced
by software breakpoint.
This needs to happen
to trap the system call.
0xCC
0x...: CC I1 .. System call is just invoked.
A VM-hypervisor context
switch occurs due to
software interrupt.
VM-exit
I.P
0x...: CC I1 .. A hypervisor-VM context
switch occurs to resume
VM execution. The instruction
pointer moves forward.
VM-entry
I.P
Fig. 13. Proposed solution incurs only two context switches
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss possible extensions of ferify
and its current limitations.
A. Potential Extensions
ferify logically should eventually be deployable to desk-
tops, cloud data centers, mobile devices5 and IoT systems, due
to its relative ease of deployment, for not requiring any kernel
modification to the VMs. The ability to perform independent
access control of individual files makes ferify a unique
building block for creating additional VM security solutions.
For brevity, we describe two of such extensions as follows.
First, we envision to extend ferify to generalize the
concept of immutable file and “lock down” parts of a running
VM to maximize the availability and integrity of certain
system services (e.g., networking) as well as user applications
(e.g., database and web severs) during their deployment. In
other words, we are interested in elevating the abstraction of
protection from files to services and applications.
Second, we are intrigued by the possibility of using
ferify to obfuscate an application work-flow to further
enhance data protection for a VM. For example, a database
operator may grant write permissions only to a randomly
generated sequence of uids through ferify and modify the
5LibVMI already supports ARM Cortex-A15 architectures
querying process to require forking an ephemeral thread with
the correct next uid in that sequence in order to write into the
database. This is possible because ferify supports sharing
of secrets, in this case a uid sequence, with authorized users
or processes in a manner transparent to the VM.
B. Limitations
While ferify is able to detect and prevent a range of
zero-day attacks, the protection is only limited to specific files
defined in the SACL. Also, the root security mechanism of
ferify is dependent on the system calls of the kernel and the
system is therefore dependent on the kernel not having mal-
ware placed in the kernel during start-up. We decided not to
expand further on kernel protection during boot-time; there are
already solutions, like vTPM [17], which implement a more
sophisticated way of securing the system’s boot procedure and
verifying that the code launched by firmware is trusted.
Additionally, ferify is currently limited in support of
multi-thread processes and multi-core systems. To support
multi-threaded applications, more work is necessary to exam-
ine the Linux kernel’s task struct in order to identify
where the required thread information is stored and determine
how to ensure their integrity. For multi-core systems, although
the way how we have utilized DRAKVUF’s capabilities should
allow direct implementation without further modification, ad-
ditional testing is required to confirm this is the case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this research we developed and evaluated ferify, an
out-of-guest file protection system capable of detecting and
even preventing a range of zero-day attacks against a specific
VM. By enforcing totally independent file access control
policy, supporting hypervisor based user authentication, and
requiring no footprint in the VM, the system has unique
advantages over existing security solutions based on known
attack signatures. In addition, we performed an investigation
into the observed high processing overhead from trapping of
system calls, one of key features enabled by current VMI
introspection software and used by ferify, which led to
a general solution that could potentially cut that overhead
by half. Finally, we observe that ferify only scratches the
surface of what is possible of leveraging the hypervisor to
achieve fine grain user data protection on an VM, and the topic
is increasingly fundamental given the seemingly inevitable
technology transition towards cloud and fog computing.
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